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Botswana gained independence in 1966 and was immediately faced with an
enormous task of development since the country was very poor and depended largely
on external aid. Ironically much of this grants in aid was British.
Political turmoil in neighboring countries and Botswana's economic fragility did
not make anything easy. National power was almost nonexistent, and Botswana
tended more to the use of diplomacy, regional and even international fora in pursuit
of her national interests.
To some extent, these endeavors were successful even though there were
occasional socio-economic and political setbacks. With positive changes that have
occurred in the regional and international climate, diplomacy, and inter-state joint
efforts have proved to be the most viable and less costly avenues for countries to
pursue.
To this end, joint regional efforts within SADC are the best way to go for
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I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian
national interest.
Winston S. Churchill, 1939
Botswana, like any other sovereign polity, has strived to achieve certain goals and
objectives for its citizens since independence. Like all other developing countries, this path
has not been easy due to the country's peculiar historical background.
This paper explores the concept and practice of regional integration perhaps as the
most viable means for Botswana to achieve those objectives it sets itself. To this end, the
example ofthe European Union, so far deemed to be classic example of such an endeavor is
heavily relied upon.
Historically speaking, there is no more opportune moment for regional integration in
Southern Africa than now owing to positive political changes that have occurred to date in
the region and the world at large.
It is against such a background that this thesis argues that the only way to go for
Botswana, and indeed for other Southern African members, is to foster regional integration
for the benefit of all.
This thesis examines regional integration as perhaps the best means through which
Botswana could best achieve her national interests within the Southern African region.
A historical background is was pertinent to give the reader the basis upon which
certain conclusions and/or deductions were made, hence Chapter II deals with this aspect.
The conceptual definition of certain terminology (national interest, integration) utilized
in the thesis was necessary; in this way then, there is no doubt in the readers mind as to what
the discussion is leading to as opposed to ambiguity fostered by varying interpretations of
terminology. Chapters II and IV cover these aspects. A summary is provided in Chapter V.
Chapter VI endeavors to provide lessons that Southern Africa could learn from the
European Union as a basis for integration. Chapter VII attempts to define the Southern
African region in terms of its country membership, its players or potential players and thus
propose regional integration as the most viable approach to achieving national interests. This
same chapter also goes further to look at the already existing structures upon which
regionalism could be fostered. In conclusion, the paper argues that regionalism remains the
most viable option for Botswana as well as Southern Africa in general if national interests are
to be achieved.
n. THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BOTSWANA, THE CONCEPTUAL
DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND ITS
APPLICATION TO BOTSWANA
Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana) was declared a protectorate in 1885 after
unrelenting appeals from Batswana 1 to Britain for protection against perceived incorporation
into the Union of South Africa2 (see Figure 1).
Britain acceded to this request because she would have attained what Cecil Rhodes
(a British mining magnate cum explorer) termed the "Suez canal of the North" where British
interests lay. As a result, Bechuanaland could provide the British with much needed territorial
buffer which could practically keep out other competing foreign powers, particularly the
Germans from meddling with British interests in the north. In this way, British access to the
interior of Africa could be facilitated through this "territorial canal" which was deemed to be
economically nonviable resulting, therefore, in the neglect by the British.
The then British High Commissioner emphasized this motive: "we have no interests
in the country north ofMolopo except as a road to the interior; we might therefore confine
ourselves for the present to preventing that part of the protectorate being occupied by either
filibusters or foreign powers doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as
1 Batswana is a term used to denote the people of Botswana. This term is plural, reference to one person
is Motswana.
2 For further details regarding the events leading to proclamation of the Protectorate and the strategic
importance of Botswana to British colonial interests, see Morton, et al., (1989, pp. 89-97) and, Tlou and
Campbell (1984, pp. 142-153).
possible." 3 Consequently, "having reluctantly assumed responsibility for the High
Commission Territories, 4 Britain proceeded to neglect them totally for fifty years. Such
development as has taken place is, in all three, effectively a post second world war
phenomenon." (Picard, 1987, p. 96)
According to Picard, the thrust ofBritish imperial fiscal policy in Bechuanaland clearly
reflected the aforementioned pattern of neglect and was even parsimonious by comparison
with other High Commission Territories; budgets in Bechuanaland were kept to a bare
minimum or below. This should come as no surprise since the colonial administration's pre-
occupation in Bechuanaland was basically two fold; 1) that the imperial government limit its
activities in the territory to the maintenance of law and order, and 2) that the territory's
population absorb the costs of the colonial administration as quickly as possible.
Subsequently, "these concerns were resolved with an efficiency unrivaled even in the generally
tightfisted economic policy that Britain followed throughout its colonial empire " (Picard,
1987, p. 97)
Pursuant to upholding law and order in the colony, it therefore comes as no surprise
that the colonial administration in 1885 soon after occupation, found the Bechuanaland
Border Police (BBP) for this purpose. For the BBP to be effective as it should have been,
3 Louis A. Picard The Politics of Development in Botswana; A Model of Success? Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Boulder Colorado; 1987, p. 36.
4The three High Commission Territories in Southern Africa which came under British protection during
the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, as a result of the struggle between the boers and
the British for dominance were; Bechuanaland in 1885 (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland
in 1 906 In each of these territories, the High Commissioner residing in Cape Town, acting through a Resident
Commissioner was proclaimed the sole legislative authority.
Malawi
Figure 1 . Map of Southern Africa.
it is perfectly logical that it had to be appropriately funded albeit arguably not to the detriment
of other projects However, British preoccupation with law and order in the territory was
manifestly reflected in the 1908 budget among other indicators in the following way: "The
two largest items of the 75,801 pounds (sterling) government expenditure were, police
(39,584) and railway subsidy (8,333); district administration was a poor fifth (3,584) and
African social services totaled 500 pounds subsidy to trades education. There was minimal
government spending even indirectly on the African population of a native territory." (Picard,
1987, p. 98)
On the one hand, the territory's population was also taxed 5 to generate some of the
government funds which were invariably channeled mostly into the maintenance of law and
order. For this reason, taxation did generate a lot of income for the colonial government and
in the process, satisfied their second aim; that the colony should be able to shoulder its
administrative expenses. As a ramification, "direct taxation of Africans accounted for 61
percent of all government revenues (in Bamangwato tribal area), and from 1911 - 1912 until
the late colonial times, the Bechuanaland Protectorate (tax) revenue matched or exceeded
expenditure." (Picard, 1987, p. 98)
The implications of this noncommittal strategy in the Protectorate on the part of the
British need not be underplayed. Thus, no expenditure was incurred to develop any form of
5 Proclamation 10 of March 1899, imposed a Hut tax at the rate of 10 shillings per hut; it was later
revised upward and provided for the Chiefs as tax collectors, with 10 per cent of the proceeds. The more one
owned huts, the more tax one was liable to pay. It is quite normal that traditionally, a household would possess up
to five huts in the same compound. "Well to do" families would even have more (huts are traditional houses made
of mud and thatched with grass).
infrastructure, health, welfare and education "which were left almost entirely to the local
missionary communities." (Picard, 1987, p. 98)
Subsequently, "the first schools in Botswana were established by the London
Missionary Society during the early part of the 19th century additional schools were
established and developed by the Hermannsburg Mission and by the Dutch Reformed and
Catholic churches." 6
The British continued to rule Botswana for eighty one years after which, Botswana
got her independence on the 30th of September in 1966 and held her first ever national
celebrations under the auspices of the Botswana Democratic Party. 7
As a result, independence hinged heavily on the negotiations that ensued and British
acquiescence to Batswana's request.
At independence, "Botswana was one of the poorest countries in Africa with an
overwhelmingly rural population depended mainly on agriculture for livelihood." 8
In the last decade ofBritish rule, Botswana had ironically depended heavily on British
grants in aid not only for investment projects but also to finance its recurrent expenditure as
6 Richard P. Stevens. Historical dictionary of the Republic of Botswana. Scarecrow Press, Inc.; Metuchen
New Jersey, 1975, p. 55.
7 At the general election held in March 1965, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won 28 of the 3
1
seats in the new legislative assembly. Britain granted internal self government thereafter and independence
discussions followed at the Bechuanaland Independence Conference in London in February of 1966, leading to the
independence of the Republic of Botswana in the same year on 30 September.
8 Ministry of Finance and Development Planning; National Development Plan 7. 1991 - 1997.
Government Printer, Gaborone, 1991, p. 11.
depicted by Table 1. At this point, their negligent approach had shifted toward assisting the
country, albeit to a minimal level.
Table 1. Annual Payments of British Grants in Aid 1956 - 1967












Source: Louis A. Picard, p. 102.
Note: British pound = U.S. $5
This chapter has thus far tried to paint a picture of Botswana's standing before and at
independence. The chapter will now attempt to conceptually define national interest and
subsequently, apply it to Botswana in a bid to deduce what the country's national interest is
or has been on the basis of its history, its budget allocations and what national interests are
generally deemed to be.
A. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST
National interests have been defined broadly as those national objectives any country
sets itself to achieve. For this reason, the concept is very elusive and susceptible to a vast
array of interpretations. According to Morgenthau, the concept of national interest is similar
to the interpretation of "great generalities" of the Constitution in liberal democracies such as
general welfare and due process. It contains a residual meaning which is inherent in the
concept, but beyond this minimum requirements, its contents can run a whole gamut of
interpretations which are logically compatible with it. To this end, "the concept of national
interest then, contains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary,
and one that is variable and determined by circumstances." 9
However, in pursuit of their national interests, countries have to make choices
between objectives since "no nation has the resources to promote all the desirable objectives
with equal vigor; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as
possible." (Morgenthau, 1986, p. 1 15) He argues that such rational allocation of resources
is based on the premise of a manifest understanding that there is a distinction between
necessary and variable elements of national interests. However, proponents and advocates
of a generally extensive concept of national interest, invariably present certain variable
elements as though their attainment was necessary for the survival of the nation Thus,
"necessary elements of the national interest have the tendency to swallow up the variable
9 John A. Vasquez, et al., (ed). Classics of International Relations : Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1986, p. 114.
elements so that in the end, all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms
of national survival." (Morgenthau, in Classics of International Relations, 1986, p. 115)
In pursuit of their national interest, nations invariably have to deal with one another
through the medium of their respective foreign policies. This phenomenon further
complicates the concept since individual national survival drives what nations term as
necessary as opposed to variable interests especially when competing with other nations. As
a result, "all nations do what they cannot help but do." (Morgenthau, in Classics of
International Relations, 1986, p. 114)
The question ofwhether an act or omission on the part on a state is good or bad does
not arise Wolfers argues that, nations like individuals or other groups, may value things not
because they value them good or less evil than their alternative. On the contrary, they may
value them because they satisfy their pride, heighten their sense of self esteem or reduce their
fears. Consequently, this paints the fluidity and sometimes the ambiguity of the concept.
In his famous 1939 speech, after Russia invaded Poland instead of being Poland's ally
against a perceived German threat, Sir Winston Churchill succinctly defined the concept in
the following way: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in
a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national
interest."
10
10 Robert Rhode James, (ed.) Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897 - 1963 . Vol. vi 1935
1942 Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 1974, p. 6161.
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Hartmann defines national interests of any country as a phenomenon categorized into
two groups; the vital and secondary interests. Vital interests are those interests for which "the
state is normally willing to fight immediately or ultimately." 11
Among these vital interests is normally the question of territorial integrity and
therefore its preservation. On the same spectrum, argues Hartmann, there are secondary
interests which states would like to attain but would not wage war for. However, he argues
that the vital and secondary interests of any country are the ones that will fashion the manner
in which nations deal with one another. In essence these interests determine the complexion
of foreign relations and subsequently foreign policy among states. As a result, "an ideal
foreign policy once formulated, contains a systematic selection of national interests in which
inconsistent interests have been weeded out, the interests have been judged against one
another in terms of priorities, and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against
estimated power and potential ofthe state to achieve those interests. (Hartmann, 1973, p. 6)
To this end, no foreign policy will encompass all possible national interests at one given time
save for those selected for implementation. This argument tallies with Morgenthau's
observation that states have to rationalize their resources when pursuing their respective
national interests. Subsequently, national interests are weighed and measured against the
country's power and ability to successfully achieve them.
This argument brings in another important dimension to the question of nation
interests; that of national power. The latter is also a wide and all encompassing concept; it
11 Frederick H. Hartmann. The Relations of Nations (4th ed.) The Macmillan Company, New York,
1973, p. 6.
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embraces all the state's social, economic and military and political capabilities. This in essence
is the ability of a nation to achieve its interests from the premise that it is perceived by others
to possess such capabilities, whether such capabilities are perceived to be real, latent or in
some extreme cases non existent.
Hence, national power is a sine qua non ingredient of the realization of national
interests. Thus according to Hartmann, if countries pursue opposed policies which prove to
be irreconcilable short of war, and countries pursue them nevertheless, recourse to the use
of force is inevitable and it is normally manifested through war, although in some cases other
measures short ofwar itself have been employed. Consequently, national interests generally
derive their flavor from the country's ability to set and pursue them successfully
B. BOTSWANA'S NATIONAL INTEREST
Because of the numerous countries on the world stage which have to deal with each
other in the name of their respective national interests, and because some may be opposed,
the ultimate definition of the concept becomes complex also as a result of other internal
factors which also have a bearing on the subject.
The result is that national interests are shaped by both factors within and without a
country's frontiers, within its borders when dealing with its citizenry and outside its borders
when dealing with its peers.
Having attempted to define the concept of national interests, the question that should
arise at this juncture should be, what is or has been Botswana's national interest? To answer
this question, one has to inevitably look at Botswana's socio-economic and political history,
the regional setting and to some limited extent, the world stage. This chapter has attempted
12
to shed some light in those respects, and on that basis it will attempt to answer the above
question. The argument has been categorized into two aspects; external and internal factors.
1. External factors
a, Extra-Regional Threats; the Super-Power Rivalry
Botswana gained her independence during the height of the cold war era. This
fact seems unimportant, but nevertheless, it is one aspect that needs to be reckoned with
During this time, newly politically independent countries were expected to identify with either
the West which stood for liberal democracy, or the East representing communism.
Aligning with either sphere of ideological influence could facilitate their socio-
economic independence as well. In this way, newly independent countries could lobby for and
acquire their much needed economic and other forms of aid. Granted, Botswana was and still
is a liberal democracy, one would have been inclined to argue therefore that, Botswana would
have naturally preferred to tilt heavily toward the west for such assistance and be reluctant
to receive the same from the east on an ideological premise.
Under the leadership of the first president of the country Sir Seretse Khama,
Botswana chose to be non aligned. To this end, democracy in Botswana emphasized the
aspect of unity and humanitarianism. In his speech at the Dag Hammarskjold Center in
Sweden in 1970, Khama argued that Botswana sought to identify with what was positive and
humane in all national ideologies. He argued that Botswana recognized certain fundamental
values and held them to be universal. That what she asked of any ideology or social system
was that it should wear a human face.
13
Thus, addressing the nation on behalf of the president, Minister Mogwe had
this to say:
True to its declared policy of non alignment, Botswana enjoys diplomatic
relations with all countries well disposed toward us irrespective of their
political philosophy. Our relations are based on the principles of sovereign
equality of states and mutual respect, on non interference in each others
internal affairs we reject the hegemony of any power. We have no truck
with spheres of influence and advancement of political doctrines. We have
military agreements with no one Paradoxically, yet true, we derive our
strength from our weakness. 12
As result, Botswana continued to profess her policy of non alignment even in
the face of possible adverse repercussions from both the east and/or the west. Fundamental
to Botswana's democracy was the condemnation of apartheid in all its forms, emphasis on
human rights, and western support ofthe then racial South Africa prompted Botswana to cry
foul even more strongly.
Hence, at a third summit conference of nonaligned states in Lusaka - Zambia
in 1970, Khama had this to say:
It is for the non aligned to point out to the rival power blocs who both claim
to act in the course of freedom, that we can only give credence to their claims
if their policies do not ride rough-shod over the values they profess to uphold
and defend. Thus the delivery of arms to South Africa and the involvement
of that country in western security arrangements are not consistent with
claims to defend freedom; just as the invasion of Czechoslovakia invalidated
similar claims on the part of the Soviet Union. (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p
93)
12 Gwcndolene Carter and Philip Morgan (eds). From the Frontline: Speeches of Sir Serctse Khama .
Hoover Institution Press; Stanford University, California, 1980, p. 214.
14
Subsequently, non-alignment translated into identification with any country
irrespective of ideology if that country upheld the principles of humanitarianism, and was well
disposed toward Botswana In this way, Botswana could lobby for and acquire her much
needed economic and other forms of aid from all quarters, even though according to Seretse,
such aid would be refused if it was perceived to be conditional.
b. Regional Threats
Pursuant to the principle of humanitarianism espoused by Botswana, the
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, the country committed itself to
providing asylum to those fleeing political persecution in their respective countries especially
in the Southern African region
Thus, Khama had argued, "whilst we will continue to offer genuine political
refugees a safe haven in our country, we will not permit such people to plan and attempt to
achieve the violent overthrow of the government of any country from within the boundaries
of Botswana." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 6)
Subsequently, because of Botswana's open-door policy toward political
refugees, Legum observed that between 1976 and 1978, there were 30,000 refugees in the
country; 20,000 ofwhom later became permanent residents. (Legum, in South Africa and Its
Neighbors: Regional Security and Self Interest, 1980, p. 803).
The implications of this policy are perhaps what became Botswana's cause for
concern and alarm especially in the realm of internal peace and stability. Because Botswana
was vehemently opposed to racism and all its inhumanity, most political refugees invariably
came from Rhodesia and South Africa. As a ramification, to these two countries, Botswana's
15
blatant support for the refugees was interpreted as an official pronouncement to aid and abate
outlawed militant groups. These included the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU),
the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in Rhodesia; the African National
Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) inter alia, in South Africa come to
mind
Ian Smith had wasted no time and spared no effort in blaming Botswana for
the escalated internal guerilla warfare activities in Rhodesia against his regime. Thus he
"refused to reckon with the fact that the freedom fighters were operating from within
Zimbabwe itself and not from Botswana or any other neighboring state." 13 (U.N. Yearbook,
1977, p. 217)
In response, Rhodesia perpetuated numerous cross boarder raids and military
excursions into Botswana under the pretext of flushing out guerrilla operatives said to be
conducting their military exploits therefrom. Smith's forces led to loss of life and property
on the part of Batswana and virtually disrupted their socio-economic activities.
In a similar vein, South Africa later carried out similar military campaigns,
waving the same lame excuse Rhodesia had and leaving the same repercussions in her wake
In essence, these "total onslaught" policies pursued by both regimes were aimed at nothing
other than to dissuade Botswana from harboring political refugees weighed against her wish
to be a sovereign, peaceful and stable
13 For a comprehensive discussion on the background to the Rhodesian struggle, refer to a Naval Post
Graduate School Masters thesis by Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone; The Search for Peace and Security: The Case of
Botswana
. 1994, pp. 17-21.
16
These military exploits nevertheless did not deter Botswana from standing up
for what she believed in, she embarked on diplomatic lobbies within the U.N. and other fora.
As a ramification, Khama had argued:
Whilst Botswana accepts that we are part of a Southern African complex and
that the harsh fact of history and geography cannot be obliterated, for obvious
reasons, we have to maintain normal friendly relations with South Africa. But
we are not deterred by our present economic weakness from speaking out for
what we believe is right. We have made no secret of our detestation of
apartheid, although we are obliged to interpret strictly the principle of non
interference in the affairs of other sovereign states. We have condemned the
theory of apartheid, nor would we fail to condemn a similar policy wherever
it occurs. (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 53)
In the interim, American foreign policy in Southern Africa did not help much to arrest the
situation. Pursuant to the "Truman Doctrine" against communism, South Africa was
considered to be the west's last defense against the Russians in Africa. Hence, taking punitive
action against apartheid South Africa, an ally against perceived Soviet threat would have been
a serious gamble with American national interests. 14
Consequently, South Africa evolved into a strong western "delinquent arm."
As a ramification, "South Africa was stronger within its region than ever before. It could
dictate or at least strongly affect the political, economic and logistical decisions of its
neighbors. It listened little to the exhortations of the United States and hardly feared
14 For further insight into U.S. policy in Southern Africa, refer to The Management of Security
Assistance. D.S.A.A., 1980, pp. 1-21.
17
expressions of Soviet displeasure. Acting with impunity within the region, and even
extending its economic ambit beyond, to offshore islands and into eastern and West Africa." 15
In the interim, the government of Botswana had delayed plans to establish a
permanent army because of opportunity costs related to military expenditure. There was in
the governments view, an immense pressure for all the available resources to be channeled
into development. This was a valid reason by any standard considering the state of economic
underdevelopment in which the country found itself at independence
To this end, the Police Mobile (PMU), an offshoot of the original BBP was the sole
government instrument charged with safeguarding not only internal law and order, but also
repelling external threats.
As a result of the aforementioned Rhodesian and South African military escapades,
Parliament passed a "Botswana Defense Force (BDF) bill on 25 March 1977" providing for
both a regular and reserve force in a bid to uphold the sanctity of the country's sovereign
territorial integrity, internal peace and stability. Estimates attributable to the Rhodesian cross
border operations were at least P65 million (U.S. 52 million in 1976 dollars) and "the BDF
formed in April 1977 to counter that threat cost another P20 million (U.S. 16 million in 1976
dollars). 16 (New African Yearbook, 1979, p. 92)
15 Robert I. Rotberg
,
et al., South Africa and its Neighbors; Regional Security and Self interest .
Lexington Books, Toronto. 1985, p. 1.
16 For further information on in-depth discussion on the BDF background, see Gaborone, 1994, pp. 29-
31.
18
To this end, territorial integrity, internal peace and stability can be argued to be one
ofBotswana's national interests, perhaps as they would for any other sovereign polity. Refer
to Tables 2a and 2b (i) and 2b (ii) for military expenditure.
2. Internal factors
a. Social and Political Considerations
At independence, Botswana had set for herself the following guiding
principles, democracy, development, self reliance and unity which became the platform upon
which all her socio-economic and political activities, together with her foreign relations would
be based. 17
As a result, Botswana's national interest was internally driven by its socio-
economic inadequacies prevalent at independence. It is worthy to mention that as a
democracy, Botswana was founded on the basis of a constitution guaranteeing rights and
individual liberties. 18
For this reason, when Botswana came into existence, there were already four
active political parties in existence; these were, the Botswana Democratic Party BDP), the
Botswana People's Party, the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and the Botswana National
Front (BNF). It is not the intention of this chapter to discuss the subject pertaining to
political parties in depth. 19
17 For further explanation on these principles, refer to Carter and Morgan, 1980, pp. 83-86.
18 See Stevens, 1975, p. 34, for an elaborate discussion on the Constitution of Botswana
19 Refer to Stevens, 1975, pp. 25-28, for further discussions on Botswana's political parties.
19



















a/) T e u
u £











































cm r- o CT> o — r»
co O O co co T* r^- in
— co */") CO O "
— CM
Oiowtowco- <o r- <n oOiOTTrincoaomaiwciO
— CMOOCM^OeoaoO — coifl O
coo— en — O) r- co en co 'O <a
— T»— CO^O — CM — CO — in
— cm
— 0©t<—• inurj — vnaoocowor^-w-otOCNcnr^ooifienio- co
—•cocMCMO^r^-u^r^ — cm
r^OcOCT^CM — CO CO O '.O
— co co co en t r— tf"> vO c-^
TT'tOOOOCOCOOCOCOr>CiTcnooTr*c^T
•rr CMCMC>CMr*-CM*neo
(O d o C^ CA — <?> t& iTi ao
CT>^T"c**Cfico'rC7)cncNjts-
-Trooo^c^^co-riN
r^-CMOO — <Oco'-ocor-coOOr^CMCOJiw»riTrir>^'roO — — cowicocf)*ncikfi'— O
*n — cm r— —
CM — —
in t csi cn










.2 o- C C -no"














- «J > 13 Z> 2


















S.S'o o o OOOOOOOJ,,
oltt t >^ >. >, >s >* >* ~ C
T-J _ — 3SS5535P>«<:a.a
a -a B c B CCCCCCoIS
o
c s s is s 5 is s s s S a
20
Table 2b(i). Summary of Expenditure.




OP + Pasl + Justice 63,309 54,111 37,410 27,190 26,970 29,710 238,700
MOFDP 89J208 80,062 60,020 50,710 52,730 51,470 384,200
Home Affairs 16,471 21,114 15,615 9,490 3,250 2.260 68,200
Agriculture 39,200 32,830 25,160 17,840 17,280 18,390 150,700
Education 104,554 127,496 120,960 136,540 132,960 131,890 754,400
Commerce 8,741 16,939 20,430 21,020 20,260 15,910 103,300
MLGL 349,485 388,665 208,020 200,500 194,590 200,940 1,542,200
Works 214,650 258,980 248,200 227,160 201.110 177,500 1,327,600
Mineral Resources 102,977 157,952 158,566 197,780 259,150 250,775 1,121,200
Health 46,099 46,986 54,545 49,620 34,450 29,500 260,800
BDF 200,000 220,000 125,000 140,000 90,000 100,000 875,000
Source: NDP, p. 7
Table 2b(ii). Summary of Expenditures.




OP + Pari + Justice 63,309 49,301 31,090 20,500 18,500 18,500 201,200
MOFDP 89,208 72,892 49,800 38,300 36,200 32,100 318,500
Home Affairs 16,471 18,999 12,800 7,200 2,200 1,400 59,070
Agriculture 39,200 29,950 20,800 13,350 11,750 11,250 126,300
Education 104,554 115,546 4\99,750 102,350 90600 81,700 594,500
Commerce 8,741 15,499 16,960 15,850 13,950 10,000 81,000
MLGL 349,485 353,765 171,800 150,500 132,900 124,650 1,283,100
Works 214,650 236,400 205,600 171,300 137,500 110,550 1,076,000
Mineral Resources 102,977 137,907 131,386 149,110 175,760 157,760 854,900
Health 46,099 42,501 45,250 37,450 23,450 18,350 213,100
BDF 200,000 200,000 100,000 100,000 50,000 50,000 700,000
Source: NDP, p. 7.
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* Legend to Tables 2b(T) and 2b(ii):
OP = Office of President
Pari. = Parliament
MOFDP = Ministry of Finance & Development Planning
Home Affairs = Ministry ofHome Affairs
Agriculture = Ministry of Agriculture
Education = Ministry of Education
Commerce = Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MLGL = Ministry of Local Governments and Lands
Works = Ministry of Works, Communications and Transport
Mineral Resources = Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs
Health = Ministry of Health
BDF = Botswana Defence Force
Source: NDP 7, pp. 77-81.
Note: All figures are in millions of Pula, currency equivalence: 1 U.S. dollar = 3 Bots. Pula.
Pursuant to the notion ofdemocracy pursued prior to independence, the BDP
pledged to work with other opposing parties if they were mandated to run the country, and
as long as such association was done in a positive manner. Khama had argued, "the
democratic Party will not stifle opposition and criticism, but will in fact, welcome all
responsible criticism of the creative type, as only by responsible and creative criticism can a
truly democratic state be assured." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 9)
As a ramification and pursuant to unity, after the BDP won the first elections,
government set to the task of unifying the country. Historically, the country was made up of
eight principal tribes; Bakwena, Bakgatla, Bangwato, Batawana, Bangwaketse, Balete,
Batlokwa and Barolong There were also some formerly subjected minor tribes in existence
among which were, Basarwa (bushmen), Bakalaka and Basubia. 20
20 Sec Stevens, 1975, p. 143, for an in-depth discussion on the Tswana tribal history.
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For this reason Khama had argued that true independence could not be
realized if ethnic cleavages were left to go unchecked as exemplified in other civil strife torn
countries across the length and breadth of Africa To this end, by 1978 Hartland-Thundberg
was able to observe the following: "The Batswana are in fact eight main tribes, all of which
speak the same language, Setswana, although English is the official tongue. These tribes are
mercifully free of traditional tribal animosities that so frequently rend other African nations." 21
To this end, Batswana view themselves not as different tribes in the country but as a
homogenous and single group.
b. Economic Considerations; Development
According to the seventh National Development Plan (NDP I)22 Botswana
was one ofthe poorest countries in Africa at independence. This is no surprise if one recalls
the history of Botswana alluded to before. Thus, development and self reliance became the
pivotal pillars upon which economic development would be pursued.
In his 1970 speech, Khama had this to say; "we are well aware that we are still
a largely undeveloped, sparsely populated country, whose first concern must be our own
development. We must put the highest priority on our development effort if independence
21 Penelope Hartland-Thundberg; Botswana: An African growth economy ; Westview Press; Boulder,
Colorado, 1978, p. 1.
22 The National development Plan (NDP) is Botswana government's six year blueprint document of
public expenditure. It outlines national policies and objectives to be adopted and pursued based on careful
planning. At the end of each six year life cycle of each plan, government has the opportunity to review past plans,
institute modifications and initiate new policies and programs to facilitate future development. In essence,
government guides economic planning through the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. However, the
private sector has input through the National economic and Advisory council (NEAC) and government realizes the
importance of such input.
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is to have real meaning for our people. We recognize that we are not a world power to be
reckoned with in the highest international circles. No other country trembles when we speak
We have no army. The machinery through which we conduct our diplomatic affairs is fairly
rudimentary." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 82) Consequently, development became
Botswana's national interest if only out of necessity rather than choice. To this end, she
proceeded to lobby for economic and other forms of aid from all corners of the world
irrespective of ideological considerations. However, such aid could only be accepted if and
only if there were no perceived "strings" attached to it, political or otherwise. Hence, "we
have in recent years received generous budgetary and development assistance from the
British. We have attracted aid from other sources including the United States. We have set
ourselves a policy of attracting overseas investment and aid from as many different sources
as possible. We ask donors only that they should not impose conditions on their aid which
would threaten our independence and our democratic and non racial way of life." (Carter and
Morgan, 1980, p. 59) Please refer to Table 3 below for government expenditure on socio-
economic development. Also note that Tables 2a through 2b (ii) depict such expenditure.
c. SelfReliance
The last principle upon which the national interest of Botswana derived its
flavor, was the concept of self reliance. Much as Botswana was to depend on foreign aid and
investment, government consistently chartered the country toward "self reliance." This
invariably meant harnessing all national resources to enable the country to limit heavy reliance
on foreign support Government had argued that it would be asking too much and unjustified
to continue lobbying for and acquiring aid, while demonstrating no potential capabilities to
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be "independent" of external support To this end, Botswana had "to demonstrate to donor
countries that we shall not be seeking aid forever and that we are seeking only that aid and
investment from abroad which will enable us to stand on our own feet." (Carter and Morgan,
1980, p. 85)
As a ramification, it can be argued therefore that, indeed, Botswana's national
interest was molded on the four principle alluded to before. The result being that,
development (socio-economic), democracy (to include peace, stability and human rights), self
reliance and unity were the pillars upon which Botswana's national interest rested and still
rests.
d. Summary
Based on the history of Botswana, the conceptual definition of national
interests, the four already discussed and budget allocations depicted by Tables 2a through 3,
the national interest of Botswana can be said to be; socio-economic development, territorial
sovereignty and democracy in all its forms to include peace, stability, security and
humanitarianism. The aforementioned tables clearly depict a trend of emphasis on socio-
economic development except when internal security has been crucially threatened
Consequently, more emphasis has been placed on military expenditure in an attempt to
preserve it. With the advent of independence in neighboring Zimbabwe and South Africa,
such expenditure on the military has been gradually declining and more emphasis is placed on
social and economical expenditure. In conclusion, if history is anything to go by, the national
interest ofBotswana will continue to bear the same flavor it has borne through the years.
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HI. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION AND THE EXAMPLE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
This paper analyzes integration as a viable path to abate the socio-economic and
political ills that plague the world in general, with particular reference to Southern Africa.
Be that as it may, it does not advocate integration as a panacea for these shortcomings, but
perhaps as the best currently available and operational option in mankind's quest for socio-
economic growth and political freedom. This concept becomes even more chronologically
relevant in the wake of an international order that has been dubbed, in some academic fora
as "triumphant liberalism". The latter is manifested in the collapse of the Soviet Union and
with it, the twentieth century historical and ideological rival of liberal democracy -
communism. Consequently, a new trend in the nature of international politics has emerged
In the most recent historical epoch (cold war era), one could almost always define a sense
of historical progression stretched out between two bipolar centers (East/West), and the
inherent subsequent national differences. In this way, unilateral national acts or omissions
could be predicted on the basis of national ideological alignment which also set the stage for
the rules of engagement. Stability was maintained, the world became a safe place for mankind
even though such safety depended on the said ideological and subsequent differences.
The rise of the U.S. led liberal democracy to international hegemony paints a
somewhat blurry picture ofwhat the inter-state rules of engagement are or ought to be in the
new international political arena. Instead of giving rise to hope for a better world, it fosters
unparalleled pessimism generated by the illusive nature of what Zbigniew Brzezinski refers
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to as "dilemmas of social existence." Hence, "The fall of communism thus raises the question
of whether its defeat is tantamount to victory of democracy in a comprehensive, systematic,
and endemic way." 23 (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 54)
As a result, the fall of communism has its own inherent ambivalence which could
foster global or regional integration, or damn it forever owing to nations pursuing national
agendas. This phenomenon highlights what has been referred to as centrifugal and centripetal
forces Aldo Ferrer observed this scenario in the following way:
The complexity of the international system today does not advise simplistic
definitions The tendency towards globalization and the need to affirm national
identities coexist in this context; The development of new forms of
organization and association which transcend the nation state paradoxically
coexist with the tendency towards the reaffirmation of national sovereignty
and prerogatives. 24
Hence, if these factors of disunity, jingoistic pursuits exist, perhaps we should take
comfort in the fact that they also exist side by side with our ability to integrate. I would
therefore ascribe the above not only to the vacuum created largely by the demise of
communism, but also to the inability of the world to create or define a new paradigm. In
effect, the long awaited "new world order" shepherded by liberal democracy, which to many
has been visibly defined by the post cold war era, is in my considered opinion a new world
23Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control . Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1993, p. 54.
24 Fernando Jorge Cardosso, et al. Report on Open Integration: Third Euro-Latin American Forum .
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon, 1995.
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order still in the making. Matthew Arnold's vivid theatrical observation captures this fact:
"We are wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other unable to be born." 25
It is in this undefined system that ethno-centricism, nationalism and other equally
captivating and mass agitating dogmas can be and have been invoked, leading to obvious civil
strife. Europe and Africa have not been spared in this regard. However, the thrust of this
paper is not to spell doom and gloom for humanity.
In my view, the post cold war era is a historically opportune moment for the
"internationalization" of liberal democracy. It is in this era that the latter becomes a possible
reality as opposed to a far fetched liberal Utopian hypothesis. It is arguable therefore that,
with the pandemic of democracy the world over, integration among states is bound to play
a pivotal role. Aldo Ferrer could not have put it any better;
Reality shows that today's great challenges, be they democratization, the
control of extreme forms of nationalism and religious or ethnic
fundamentalism, the resolution of inter- or - intra- state conflicts as well as the
problems of a demographic nature and poverty, require political, economic
and strategic responses which transcend the capabilities of any single power .
This includes the United States which is still debating the role it should play
in the post cold war era. (Ohmae, 1995, p. 7) (emphasis added)
With this background in mind, it is therefore in order to discuss the concept of
integration itself.
25 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies. Free Press, New York,
1995.
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A. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION
Perhaps the most appropriate approach would be to discuss what integration is not.
Common use ofthe term invokes a sense of some phenomenon akin to what is defined in the
sphere of political science as regionalism. The latter is defined by Leroy Bennett as;
"A segment of the world bound together by a common set of objectives based on
geographical, social, cultural, economic, or political ties and possessing a formal structure
provided for in informal intergovernmental agreements." 26
Thus, regionalism although possessing the underlying characteristics and objectives
of integration, is lacking politically in that nations still wield their political sovereignty
Integration on the other hand, is a relatively new concept. Webster's dictionary defines
integration as " to make or become whole or complete" and "to bring (parts) together into a
whole." Intuitively, this means annihilating all the differences that may exist between parts and
thus making them one! This is the idealistic definition of integration. Therefore, integration
goes a step further than regionalism. It strives for a complete merger in between states even
at a political level. The classic case of the European Union comes to mind at this juncture.
However, integrating states necessarily have to be democratic. As a result, liberal democracy
becomes an important ingredient for the process. Fernando Jorge Cardosso defines
integration as:
A freely adopted association of states legitimized by democracy . It is based
on a clear legal foundation. It presupposes the desire to achieve a significant
degree of economic policy convergence. It must create the institutions
necessary to attain shared objectives and resolve differences through
A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations. Principles and Issues . Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1995.
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negotiation If it is to contribute to a more stable international order,
integration should both be economically and politically open." (Cardosso, et
al., 1995, p. 11)
Subsequently, the idealistic conception of integration, especially regional integration
is in fact a microcosm of universalism. However, in practice, nationalism in all its forms has
equated integration with regionalism for various reasons; ideology, inter-national economic
disparities, sovereignty, and especially the absence of democracy within and without national
frontiers.
Hence the argument for a historically opportune moment for the internationalization
of democracy, which would act as a spring board for "integration." Having risen out of the
need for inter state concerted efforts against socio-economic and political ills that could breed
conflict, and as rule found on a democratic basis, integration has the following two aspects:
B. CONVERGING INTERESTS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT
Humanity possesses an inherent paradoxical quality regarding its interests,
homogeneity and heterogeneity. Since nations are composed ofhuman beings, they ipso facto
wield the same qualities and the power to harmonize both. With regard to integration,
institutions or "clearing houses" should be created in order to tap this ability to harmonize
interests especially divergent ones, which are a potential source of conflict in a democratic
atmosphere. Failure to exercise democracy in these fora, relegates integrative processes to
nothing but the enunciation of grand objectives. The assumption is that, democracy in fact
rears a sense of openness among states and therefore promotes mutual respect for inherent
differences like culture, civilization, economic disparities, etc. According to Cardosso:
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Democracy has less to do with rigid models of political and social
organization and more to do with respect for fundamental rights, the
international rule of law, peaceful solution of conflicts, strengthening of
international cooperation and the use of political and economic integration
mechanisms to guarantee the protection of shared interests. (Cardosso, et al.,
1995, p. 17)
C. THE ROLE OF TOLERANCE
Because ofthe inherent centripetal and centrifugal forces conniving against the world
today, tolerance becomes an important aspect in world affairs particularly with regard to
integration It should therefore not be limited in scope to the classical religious or political
tolerances Rather, it should be extended to embrace linguistic, ethnic, cultural, racial and
other aspects of social existence. This becomes important in that it would breed peaceful co-
existence between states, despite their differences bred by their inequalities and perhaps
inadequacies in some instances. As Cardosso observes and rightly so: "The broader vision
of tolerance is necessary to achieve peaceful co-existence in an international system
characterized by strong elements of discontinuity and heterogeneity, whose strength feeds the
logic of fragmentation but is also capable of achieving unification ." (Cardosso, et al., 1995,
p. 17)
Consequently, democracy becomes an important ingredient for tolerance as it
inevitably presupposes the recognition of the Other. This fosters negotiation as a vehicle of
interstate interactions and invariably calls for the readiness on the part of the players to
compromise In this way, complex and sensitive differences, some pertaining to sovereignty
and state autonomy, can be reconciled.
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The result is that, no single view point is imposed by force, and persuasion rather than
imposition becomes the order of the day. Persuasion arises out of the recognition of the
Other and therefore, the Other's capacity for reason. It has been argued that there is not one
truth, that truth is in fact multi-faceted. Subsequently, to unfathom the universal truth
requires a great deal of tolerance if this argument is upheld:
One becomes aware of the fact that tolerance is essential when one realizes
that in a world ofno defined polarities, it is impossible to reconcile conflicting
logics. Thus the need to find a modus vivendi within the international system
which will make centripetal and centrifugal forces compatible through a
process of mutual recognition and successive approximations. (Bennett,
1995, p. 18)
Consequently, interstate tolerance is expressed when power ceases to be the criterion
that guides nation- to- nation relations. Powerful countries do not impose their views/will on
their weaker partners because, it is with the accommodation of their weak partners that a
solid, coherent whole can be built. Hence, negotiation becomes a permanent and continuous
feature of democratic tolerance.
So far this paper has dealt with the concept of integration primarily from a political
and ethical perspective. Integration in its totality does not only deal with the political aspect
of human co-existence; it also embraces the social and economic aspects. With this notion
in mind therefore, social integration becomes an important windfall brought about by
economic integration.
The latter has been identified to lie on a continuum; from the existence of a free trade
area on one end, to the establishment of complete economic integration. According to Bela
Balassa, economic integration: "can take several forms that represent varying degrees of
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integration. These are a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic
union, and complete economic integration." 27
In a free trade area, economic restrictions between participating countries are
abolished but each country sets its own controls or restrictions against non members A
customs union on the other hand, not only endeavors to suppress commodity movement
discriminations between the members, it also tries to set equivalent trade restrictions with non
members, e.g., tariffs.
In a common market, both inter-trade restrictions and restrictions on factor
movements are abolished. Subsequently, factors of production like labor and capital also
wield uninhibited inter country movement. An economic union differs from a common market
in that it strives constantly to suppress any form of economic discrimination that could arise
due to commodity and factor disparities among the states.
Total economic integration takes the process even further than the common market,
it becomes a merger between integrating states in all economic endeavors, and presupposes
the existence of a political authority whose directives or decisions are binding and paramount
to those of the integrating states. In effect, total economic integration is political in its nature.
The question that should be addressed at this point is why countries integrate; are the
underlying reasons socio-economic, are they political, or on the other hand, are they a mixture
of all these aspects? The answer to this question should in my mind dictate the form by which
countries should come together in the already discussed integration continuum.
27 Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G Stubb (eds.) The European Union. Readings on the Theory and
Practice of European Integration . Lynne Rienner; Boulder Colorado, 1994.
34
To this end, this chapter attempts to look briefly into the workings of the European
Union (EU); why the organization was incepted in the first instance, how it operates and what
stumbling blocks has the EU come across and what applications if any, can be drawn from it
for Botswana?
D. INTEGRATION: THE EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Some scholars have argued that, although the European Union has come to be what
we know it to be in the aftermath of the second world war, the concept of a United Europe
can be found "amidst the chaos of feudalism" in the 1 1th century.
In this era, social order and European unity was maintained by papal claims to
universal authority under the banner of Christianity. The division into the east and west
Christianity in 1054 sowed the first seeds of fragmentation in Christian Europe and "men and
women harassed by the extortions of the lord of the manor, began to seek protection under
the territorial prince." 28
Subsequently, social order was maintained by political units; the great princes who
according to Schmitt, committed on a grand scale what robber barons had perpetrated from
behind the fastness of their mountain haunts.
This invariably led to social anarchy and a subsequent call for European unity by both
the meek for protection and, the mighty who saw it as a platform for their hegemonic dreams.
This social order was to be entrusted to a gathering of kings, princes and ambassadors who
represented diverse interests, and it is no surprise then that the situation did not abate.
28 Hans A. Schmitt; The Path to the European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market
Louisiana State University Press, 1962.
35
In the seventeenth century therefore (1650), the Quakers saw international
organization in Europe as the solution for the warring European rulers Hence; "in 1693,
William Perm called for a European Parliament, not a democratic gathering but an institution
representing peoples rather than princes. John Beller, his coreligionist, wished to divide
Europe into one hundred constituencies, each to send one representative to a European
Senate." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 4)
These notions of a United Europe rallied no support. Europe still experienced social
turmoil brought about by the lack of peace and the subsequent civil strife. Thus according
to Schmitt, the task of finding the right throne for the right prince kept armies and diplomats
in constant agitation. However, plans to unite Europe seemed to take root and appealed
more to the principle of arbitration: "A court was to replace the diplomatic conference as the
agent of peace." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 5)
The French revolution did endow men with the thinking that freedom was the only key
to peace and order; and Constantine Francoise Volney clearly buttressed this new way of
thought. "Let us banish all tyranny... let us form but one society... and soon mankind will
have but one constitution but one law, that of nature; one code, that of reason; one throne,
that ofjustice; one altar, that of union " (Schmitt, 1962, p 5)
However, Europe had her share of peace and economic well being that was tied to it
It is in this time that the idea of a United Europe was somewhat relegated to the periphery of
mens minds, only to be vividly recalled later with the advent of "Hitlerism" in Germany It
is during this time according to Schmitt that, Hitler joyfully described the Eastern European
Front as the melting pot from which a "European" race was to pour forth
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The German objective was not order for Europe but its conquest. This is the very
phenomenon that Europe has been trying to rid itself of for centuries. As a ramification, the
only plausible solution seemed to be a united front against Germany which culminated with
the allied victory over Hitler in the second world war. In the interim, a committee on the
workings of the European question had reservations on this issue. However; "At the end of
the war, its reservations born of German excesses, vanished with victory." (Schmitt, 1962,
p. 15)
Hence, the question of a United Europe gained momentum primarily in the post war
rehabilitation ofEuropean economies, where the United States necessarily had to play a major
role "until America became converted to the cause, peace brought a visible deceleration to
the European momentum. Before the panaceas oftomorrow could be brought to fruition, the
bare existence of today had to be assured. Without necessities there would be no survival,
without survival no Europe in any form." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 16)
As a result, American aid flowed to Europe under the Marshall Plan and thanks to
communist pride, it excluded the Soviet Union. The latter had now in the minds of Western
countries resuscitated once again, the fear of external aggression and domination, and the
Truman Doctrine became America's and invariably Europe's answer to the Soviet threat.
The Treaty ofBrussels signed on the 17th of March in 1948 between Britain, France
and the Benelux had "called for collective self defense and economic, social and cultural
collaboration." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 35)
This Treaty led to the inception of the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), which
gave rise to the European Defense Community (EDC) for defense matters and later the
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Council ofEurope (COE) as an expression of Pan Europeanism This feeling was buttressed
by Sir Winston Churchill earlier in 1946 at Zurich university when he had called for a "United
States ofEurope." Nevertheless, the COE was relegated to a mere consultative body without
any powers to do anything except make recommendations to the ministers. Consequently,
the Council became what Shanks referred to as "a mere talking shop without any powers."
This ipso facto meant that the Council failed to provide a genuine European
Parliament in the strictest parliamentary sense. Its members were primarily national politicians
whose main interests were in and to their respective legislatures Hence the COE was
relegated to dealing with social and cultural matters. On the other hand, American non
support of the Brussels Treaty and emphasis on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), an organization with an Atlantic as opposed to a European image frustrated the pan
European mood
Hence the BTO receded into the background while NATO took center stage because
Europe could not hope to cope with her own security arrangements unilaterally without U.S.
assistance both militarily and economically. As if it was not enough, the outbreak of the
Korean war only served to show how Europe was vulnerable to Soviet attack, and NATO
seemed to provide the answer to this threat.
As a result, the EDC had been superseded by NATO, and just as the Marshall Plan
had shown in the economic sphere, Europe needed America for her survival! The collapse
of the EDC gave rise to the Western European Union (WEU) which included the Six and
Britain, a somewhat security oriented but shaky organization
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Prior to the formation ofthe EDC and the COE, the Six had invited Britain to join and
found the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 to which Britain declined
Nevertheless ECSC was found on the basis of two premises, economical and political;
economically it would abolish trade barriers for these products between member countries and
strengthen their economies in the process. Politically it would entail the establishment of
supranational control in this area, it would also annihilate any future potential conflict
between Germany and France In essence, it would bring the member countries closer
together on the political level strengthening the concept of Pan Europeanism.
The success of the ECSC was manifest since it dealt with the economic aspect and in
the process yielded industrial benefits. To this end, more Europeans started to think that
perhaps the best way to unite Europe was to begin on an economic plane. "The Europeans
had learned the lesson ofthe failure of the Council ofEurope and the EDC, compared to the
success of the ECSC. If Europe was to be united, it must be through economic rather than
through political means." 29
The success of the ECSC led to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in
June of 1955 in Sicily, out ofwhich the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
and the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market were born. The former
was designed along the same lines as ECSC except it dealt with atomic energy among the Six
at a "supranational" level. The Treaty ofRome in 1957 had established EURATOM for both
economic and political reasons as well.
29 Michael Shanks and John Lambert, The Common Market Today and Tomorrow. Frederick A. Praeger,
New York, 1962.
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Economically, atomic power was thought to be the answer to Europe's post war
energy deficiencies although the primacy ofEURATOM was undercut by the extensive use
of oil and natural gas for energy requirements. Politically, EURATOM became Europe's
answer to catching up with Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of
nuclear development and research. The role of EURATOM therefore became one of
initiation and coordination. "There was never any suggestion that it should take over, even
less control, the national programs. Its task was, and is, to ensure their harmonious
development." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 107)
Up to this point, one can safely argue that attempts to unify Europe, in line with the
concept of integration per se, still fell short of the mark. If anything, European countries
simply banded together more for economic expedience than for political integration.
Perhaps a more radical move toward integration found its beginnings with the
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market, provided
for by the Treaty ofRome in 1957. It involved nothing less than a complete merger of the
economies ofthe Six so that they could become at least in the economic sphere, a single state.
It thus defined objectives, the modus operandi for reaching those objectives and
further set up institutions to facilitate these grand objectives The architects of the EEC
having learned from both the successes of the ECSC and the EDC fiasco realized that "the
foundations of political unity must be laid in the economic sphere." (Shanks and Lambert,
1962, p. 44) for success to be guaranteed although it was not synonymous with dramatic
surrender of national sovereignty.
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In this way, the long run final objectives of the Common Market were what mattered
most; "but the details of how they are to be achieved, and their immediate effects, depend
upon a never ceasing process of compromise, discussion, consultation and conciliation ."
(Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 45) (emphasis added)
The above phenomenon was to be carried out through the following institutions, the
Commission, the Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the Council of Ministers
and the European Court.
1. The Commission
The Commission, according to Shanks, was the "guardian of the Treaty"; it ensured
that it was fully and fairly applied. On taking office, members swore an oath to maintain full
independence and therefore serve only the interests of the Community (thus, applying the
Treaty ofRome without fear or favor).
Each member was in charge of a particular field of economic or social relations, e.g.,
transport, agriculture, health etc., but the Community was collectively responsible for its
actions. Under the Commission was an administrative apparatus employing some 3000
people from the Six at its inception. These were initially responsible for the creation of
legislation governing the relations of states and citizens of Europe in any matter under the
umbrella of the Treaty.
The said legislation would be made in consultation with all the relevant players of the
signatories. For example, free movement of workers would involve the Commission with
departments of countries concerned and, employers and workers' organizations and all other
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bodies with a direct interest; plus national representatives and experts. Formal proposals
would be made and forwarded to the Council for decision making.
It is in order to mention that, although the Council of Ministers has the final authority
in making decisions based on the recommendations of the Commission, it necessarily has to
consult with the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee before it hands down
its decisions.
2. The Parliament
The Common Assembly of 1952 consisting of 71 members ofparliament from the Six,
whose job was to exercise parliamentary control over the workings of the ECSC, in effect
provided a stepping stone for the genesis of the European Parliamentary Assembly The
latter's responsibility, whose membership composed of the doubled original 71, was to
oversee the workings of all three Communities; ECSC, EURATOM and the Common
Market.
In March of 1962, the Assembly officially decided to call itself the European
Parliament, although its members were not elected to parliament but were appointed delegates
from their respective national parliaments. The other drawback was that, the parliament had
no legislative authority; it merely gave its opinions on matters before the Council - over which
it had no power at all.
However, it has drawn its influence from its ability to make the High Authority or the
Commissions resign by passing a vote of censure It is unlikely that it would do so presently
and it would also have no say in their replacement in the event that it does pass that vote.
42
Voting is conducted along party rather than national lines. Perhaps the true nature of this
Parliament is summarized by Shanks as follows;
The Parliament is a deceptive institution. Anyone attending its sessions and
hearing the detailed technical debates or the impassioned on political
integration may tend to over-estimate its importance. Lacking the essential
characteristic of a democratic parliament- direct contact with the electors, it
remains a phantom assembly; it enacts the role of a parliament, but it has no
powers and its members no constituencies. (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p.
50)
3. The Economic and Social Committee
This Committee was set up as a vehicle through which various economically interested
parties within the Common Market could have their voice heard; for example, the trade
unions, employers organizations, professions like lawyers, economists, atomic experts and so
on. Modeled along the same lines as the ECSC consultative committee of workers, employers
and consumers, its members are appointed by the Council based on government submissions.
It strives to accommodate all parties concerned on any issue discussed by it so that
ultimately a compromise is struck With its highly technical, economic and social capability,
it is in my view analogous to a think tank. Thus; "the Committees major role in its first four
years has been as a forum for views of the various sectors, enabling the Commission to
estimate the reaction that its proposals have provoked throughout the member countries ."
(Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 51)
It is my considered opinion therefore that the Committee's responsibility will not stray
fundamentally away from this initial premise.
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4. The Council of Ministers
The Council is composed of Foreign Ministers of the members and has permanent
Secretariat based in Brussels Other ministers from member countries may join the
deliberations of the Council particularly, if such deliberations affect their particular sectors.
The Council takes decisions on matters brought before it by the Parliament and the Economic
and Social Committee and consequently bringing those recommendations into effect Because
recommendations from Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are compromises
in themselves, they are ipso facto bound to contain some elements with which members are
not in agreement. Thus, it is the duty of the Secretariat to make final concessions with the
help of national experts on such "pending" issues before they are submitted to the council
Hence; "Once this sifting process is complete, the only problems which are put to the
Ministers are those where a major decision, which only the minister himself has the authority
to make, is required to concessions needed for agreement." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p.
52)
As a ramification, having worked together over a long time, the ministers tend to
appreciate each others problems. For this reason, opposition of member states on issues even
before the Council is taken into cognizance and "always a compromise is sought." (Shanks
and Lambert, 1962, p. 52)
The Treaty also provides for a unanimous vote of the Council in order to make
amendments in the Commissions proposals even where a majority decision is possible Once
the Council adopt matters before it, they become law through out the Community and the
Commission draws directives for their implementation.
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These directives have to be approved as well by the Council and the Commission then
ensures compliance by member states. Should any member flout the Treaty or the Council's
decisions, the commission then; writes a letter to the culprit state requiring an explanation and
a "motivated opinion" requiring an end to such an act If all fails, then the Commission takes
recourse to justice and brings the violator before the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.
5. The Court
The Court is to the European Communities what the International Court of Justice is
to the United Nations. However, the Court extends its justice within the Community, not
only to members and institutions but also to individuals and all parties are bound by its
decisions. Consequently, it is the final authority in the interpretations of the Treaties within
the Community.
It is composed of seven judges (two Italians and one from each member country), two
advocates general (one French and one German). When a dispute is taken to the Court, the
conflicting parties first present their cases in writing, exchange arguments and supply
documentary evidence. A public hearing where both parties present their cases.
This is followed by a further hearing at which one of the Advocates General provides
his own impartial view on the merits of the matter and what he considers could be a fair
judgement by the court. Because the latter is merely an expert interpretation of the Treaty
in light of the issue in question, the Court is not bound by his deliberations. Nonetheless, the
Court infrequently deviates from his recommendations when it gives its ruling.
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The mere fact that the Court's ruling is binding and cannot be appealed, has made this
institution a very powerful one within the Community. However, since these rulings derive
their authority from the interpretation of the Treaties, it has been argued that in effect, this
very exercise leaves room for further interpretations, thereby not making these binding rulings
as watertight as they should ideally be.
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IV. SUMMARY
These then are the essential institutional frameworks created to facilitate the
development of the Common Market (within the Community), although other organs such
as the European Investment Bank also play their part. Thus, the ultimate aim and objective
of the Common Market is to merge the economies of the member states into one, by breaking
down the barriers between them and providing common policies.
It is not the intention of this chapter to home onto the finer nitty gritties of the
workings of the Community like; common immigration and migration policies, labor
movement, anti cartelization laws, agriculture, and general economic growth oriented policies
to mention just a few. Suffice it to say nonetheless that, all these measures have been
implemented and with some measure of tangible success.
Up to this point, we have seen that Europe has managed to forge some form of
economic "integration" (the E.U.); all the necessary infrastructure for facilitating this
phenomenon is in place. However, there is a gray area in the system in that the necessary
political dosage is inadequate. Recall that although the Council of Ministers gives the
necessary authority to its operations which then bind the members, these ministers are still
responsible to their respective governments and elected to office by their nationals at home
Although the operations of the Council are based on compromise, would it be
farfetched to argue that elected officials the world over, tend to know which side their bread
is buttered? I do not think so. Could this then be a presenting problem for the Common
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Market? The answer to this question in my mind can be found by further investigation into
the workings of the Common Market or could it now be termed a European Union?
Since the completion of the common Market in 1968, the European Community has
been striving constantly for a metamorphosis to which the French have unapologetically
referred to as "the relaunching of Europe," perhaps toward the birth of a new entity. This
renewed vigor for overhauling the community is a result of the inadequacy of the latter's
political clout; in effect, the members constant retention of their national sovereignties
The community per se is not only the fruit of history and necessity, but also of political
will. In his famous Bruges speech in 1989, Jacques Delors argues that: "Despite the success
of our Community based on the rule of law, disputes about sovereignty continue We need
to face the issues squarely." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 57) To this end, emphasis on natural
sovereignty seemed to threaten the very existence of the community at that time.
I shall not endeavor to document all the European's contributions from Charles De
Gaulle to Jacques Delors However, I shall make references to some in order to emphasize
the point of my argument As I have already argued, the once highly eulogized concept of
a "United States of Europe" seems to be sabotaged by national sovereignty. In February of
1986, twelve members of the Community signed the "Single European Act" (SEA) and
implemented it in 1987. The essence of the SEA in my considered opinion, is none other than
to add the dimension of foreign policy to the already existing Community agreements. To this
end, I am inclined to argue that it diplomatically evaded the subject of national sovereignty
which according to Delors, threatens the very existence of the European community The
Preamble states: "The Preamble assumed that the European Communities resembled a
48
sovereign entity more than a mere collection of individual states..." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994,
p. 43) (emphasis added)
In effect, the assumption was just an assumption, a false one at that. Andrew
Moravcsik buttresses this view thus; "The SEA was the result of bargaining among the heads
ofgovernment of the three most powerful EC countries: Britain, France and Germany; that
these bargains represented the lowest common denominator; and that each leader jealously
protected national sovereignty." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 21)
Prior to Jacques Delors speech at Bruges, Margaret Thatcher had given her famous
speech at the same place one year before in September of 1988 She viewed the EC not as
"the United States of Europe", but rather as "a family of European Nations", thus rejecting
the concept of total integration.
Although the EC was the brainchild of 'far sighted men,' Thatcher had
argued, Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France,
Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and
identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit
European personality. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 48)
As a ramification, Jacques Delors, Altiero Spinelli and others sought to provide the
skeptics with an answer to the question of national sovereignty. The answer argues Delors,
lies with federalism coupled with subsidiarity:
I often find myself invoking federalism as a method, with the addition of the
principle of subsidiarity. I see it as a way of reconciling what for many appears
to be irreconcilable; the emergence of a united Europe and loyalty to one's
homeland; the need for a European power capable of tackling the problems
of our age and the absolute necessity to preserve our roots in the shape of our
nations and regions. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 52)
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In essence argues Delors, this would provide a unified Europe under one political
umbrella at a supranational level, and still maintain different national identities which have
manifested themselves by invoking the principle of national sovereignty. The latter has no
doubt become a problem for a United Europe. The principle of federalism referred to here
is no different from the time honored American system.
The principle of subsidiarity on the other hand, varies from federalism according to
Delors in that; nothing is entrusted to a bigger unit that can be best done by a smaller one.
This is in effect a decentralized system.
In my mind therefore, I see no radical difference between it and federalism per se.
After all, isn't federalism a decentralization of power where smaller units perform precisely
those functions they do best? Again the classic example of the American system comes to my
mind It is my opinion therefore that, Delors and other proponents of subsidiarity, in effect
have engaged in deliberate word-smithing to try and paint a different system from that of the
Americas when in fact there is no difference.
The problem is that of sovereignty In a federal setting, national sovereignty, the
power to wheel and deal with other foreign nations inter alia, rests with the federal
government and the units or states do not wield those powers. Consequently, they are not
sovereign by themselves without the system.
If giving to states "what they do best" (subsidiarity!), also involves the negotiation of
treaties, then they still wield political sovereignty and are recognized as such in international
law! If on the other hand this means performing only, other less politically weighty social
obligations like; the provision of health facilities, education structures, etc., then in my mind
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federalism is synonymous to subsidiarity! It is no different from the saying that one cannot
eat their cake and have it simultaneously, one has to make a choice.
This is no different from the European case This in my view, is what haunts and will
continue to haunt the European Union unless they decide to employ federalism as we know
it, not a variation of the concept if political unity is their final goal. After all federalism in my
view is but one concept; I know not of variations thereto but I am willing to learn.
On the 17th of February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty came into existence in effect
reflecting Delors thinking on the principle especially with reference to the principle of
subsidiarity thus; "respect for Europe's core values, increased accountability, and faithful
application of the principle of the principle of subsidiarity will, according to the Treaty,
preserve democracy and diversity within the new Europe." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 65)
(emphasis added)
The Treaty added to the Community, the aspect ofa single currency, common foreign
and security policies. In my view, the Treaty also very diplomatically evades the very thorny
question regarding national sovereignty, which in my mind is accounted for by the use of the
term - diversity - in the preamble. Could this then refer to diverse sovereign nations within
the Union? My answer to this question is in the affirmative.
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V. LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union has had its successes primarily and specifically in the economic
sphere To deny this would be a display of sheer tenacious ignorance. From following the
organization's history, it becomes clear to me that the European case does not differ from the
economic integration that has been defined to lie on a continuum; where free trade exists on
one hand and total economic integration lies on the other extreme end.
Indeed, the Union began by dismantling trade barriers among the members with the
inception ofthe ECSC; this displays the characteristics of a customs union on the economic
integration continuum. Today the members are still striving for a complete economic merger
manifested by the Maastricht treaty which proposes the use of a common currency among
other equally important aspects; this move endeavors to upgrade European integration to a
common market, still on the same economic continuum.
In short, the Union has pursued a step by step functional approach to integration
whose successes have been largely socio-economical and less so in the political arena, save
for the "ability" to foster peace in Europe. The EDC which later evolved into WEU comes
to mind, whose objective was to hold the Germans and later the Soviet Union in check;
Ironically Germany's defeat in the second world war did not lay to rest, the very vivid and
gory details of the Third Reich's dreams and escapades before and during the war. To this
day, the German question has not been resolved by the European Union.
The defeat ofthe Soviet Union with the help ofNATO, manifested by the collapse of
communism is another successful milestone Europe can also take pride in Both the
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EDC/WEU and NATO go a long way to depict functional integration at its best, and indeed
as I have argued before, the European nations' unrelenting reluctance to part with their
political clout completely.
Hence the use ofterms like "supranationality" and subsidiarity which in my view, are
no different from federalism as we know it.
Ernst Haas had argued that:
Supranationality is not at the end of a continuum, whose other end is occupied
by strict intergovernmentalism. Instead, supranationality refers to a process
or style of decision making; a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which
the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead
seek to attain agreements by means of compromises upgrading common
interests. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 245)
First of all the prefix -supra- before nationality, in my mind means above. If this
argument holds, then intuitively, whatever happens at this level is clearly above any nation
within the Union; this process to me invokes the concept of federalism. Again the classic
American case comes to my mind. If then this argument is bought, Haas' contention about
supranationality is obliterated.
Furthermore, supranationality and intergovernmentalism do lie on a continuum and
at both extreme ends in my opinion The evolution of the European Union to date emphasizes
this argument. The fact that today, the Union's very existence is threatened by national
sovereignty does no less so
It is my opinion that these concepts are analogous to the phenomena of night and day,
which lie on a continuum themselves. Yes, there is dawn and there is dusk. To me they are
just stepping stones on the same continuum facilitating the smooth completion of the daily or
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nightly metamorphosis between the two extremes. Even a cloudy day does not mean it is not
day. Do they now negate the fact that indeed both extremes do exist? I think not
It is for this reason that I hasten to add that, indeed Haas bypasses the essence of the
phenomenon. What about the question of sovereignty? I would argue that not Haas'
"supranationality" or Delors' subsidiarity, but classical federalism as we know it could be the
answer to the Union's woes.
This could be possible if and only if the likes of Margaret Thatcher agree to the
concept. Is it likely that they will? For one thing it is not impossible, although it has certainly
proven to be the most difficult obstacle that the Union will face now and in the future.
What lessons can be drawn from this experience for Botswana? Clearly the EU's
economic success is one thing to be admired if not emulated. Perhaps functional integration
by phases within Southern Africa can follow the same route for the benefit of all members
concerned. However, national sovereignty is the "Frankenstein" monster that is bound to
impede integration and perhaps, threaten the very existence of any joint regional efforts. If
it was not so, Europe would be totally integrated today.
Would federalism be the answer? In my mind the answer is twofold; yes and no. Yes
because then complete integration can be attained on the same lines as the classic American
example, leading perhaps to a "United States of Southern Africa." No because different




VI. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION, ITS PLAYERS, AND ARGUMENTS
FOR REGIONALISM
Regional organizations have been defined on the basis of a variety of criteria, but most
often on the premise ofgeographical proximity of members. However, others still have defied
this sort of definition and fell under the umbrella of "functionalism" as a criteria as distinct
from geography
Consequently, while geography has been pivotal in such definitions of regional
organizations, some organizations said to fall under the same category, have been
commanding membership from countries across the globe.
Thus, according to Bennett, the U.S. for example, is a member of several
organizations that claim regional status and that reach to almost every point of the compass,
thus variously identifying the United States with the North Atlantic, American, and South
East Asian areas, none of which conform to any natural geographic region Hence,
the North Atlantic area opens to question whether an ocean represents a
unifying factor or a barrier for determining a region; the inclusion of Greece
and Turkey in the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
throws further doubt on conformity to regional limits. The now defunct
South East Asia Treaty Organization, wasfor the protection of South East
Asian countries, but it was dominated by non-Asian states, which formed the
majority of its membership. The membership ofthe Organization of American
States includes all states in North, South and Central America, but
geographers have never viewed both continents as a single well defined
region (Bennett, 1995, p. 230).
For purposes of this research, regionalism should be construed to be an all
encompassing term where both geographical proximity and "functionalism" are relevant
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criteria. This notion is prompted by an array of factors; Tanzania is a founding member of
the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) because of historical-political ties
with the region, yet geographically speaking, Tanzania belongs more to Central Africa than
to the South.
In August of 1994, Mauritius became the 12th member of SADC; yet even Mauritius
is about 1200 miles East ofMozambique and not only separated from mainland Africa by a
stretch of the Indian ocean, but, also by another whole country - The Malagasy Republic
(Madagascar). See Figure 2 for the geography of the region.
If this is so then, it is also arguable that it is possible in the future to see Madagascar
enter SADC as the 13th member. As a ramification, regionalism or regional integration
should not only be limited to geographical contiguity ofmembers but should also consider the
functional aspect as another crucial foundation upon-which the organization will hinge.
Subsequently, it is the goals and objectives of SADC that will ultimately determine
which country should be a player in the organization without undue emphasis on the question
of geographical location of that country, albeit geography has hitherto been an important
ingredient in "regional" endeavors. To this end, although regionalism in this case focusses on
Southern Africa, it does not totally preclude countries without the Southern African regional
context.
The following countries are current members of SADC listed in alphabetical order:
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,








ANGOLA Members of the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference
Figure 2. Map of Southern Africa.
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A. ARGUMENTS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION FROM BOTSWANA'S
POINT OF VIEW
1. The Geographical Location of Botswana
Botswana is at the heart of Southern Africa, physically sandwiched by the other
members of the region. This historical-geographical misfortune, somewhat dictated and still
dictates that the country must inevitably rely on its neighbors for access to the outside world
in terms of social, economic and political links.
To this end, historically, Botswana has had to perform a very precarious balanced
juggling act of antagonism and accommodation vis-a-vis its racist neighbors least it generated
perpetual economic and military punitive reactions.
This phenomenon was also a result of the country's weak and dependent economic
posture. Chapter I sufficiently discusses Botswana's economic capabilities, or perhaps
incapabilities. To this end, out of necessity, the country has had to pursue certain "dictated"
policies and positions regarding its neighbors particularly apartheid South Africa and
Rhodesia, in the hope of realizing economic and other forms of development in the process.
Historically, other countries like Mozambique, have also played a significant role in
providing Botswana with her much needed links with the outside world However, because
of destabilization tactics employed by Pretoria in Mozambique, these alternative options were
not fully utilized, coupled with South Africa's economic and infrastructural strength within
the region. 30 (Maandaza and Tostensen, 1994, p. 41)
30For further readings on South Africa's destabilization activities in the region, refer to; Johnson P. and
Martin D., Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War . Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986.
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According to Mandaza and Tostensen, at the time of the 1980 SADC Lusaka Summit,
South African ports handled 80 per cent of the external trade of six inland SADC states, with
SADC ports handling the other 20 per cent. By 1982, with the opening of routes through
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, an approximate 50:50 ratio was achieved. "However, this
advance to a more economically rational system was quickly countered by South Africa's
destabilization strategies." 31
International traffic had briefly resumed on the Benguela railway in Angola in 1979,
but was again swiftly disrupted by South Africa's backed UNITA forces. 32 Attacks by South
African supported rebels on the Beira corridor were stepped up, until at the request of
Mozambique, Zimbabwe stationed its own troops along this corridor in 1982.
The independence of the Republics of South Africa, Namibia, and perceived political
stabilities and democracy in Mozambique and Angola, do not in themselves obliterate this
position; Botswana will remain landlocked and subsequently dependent on her neighbors for
her vital links with the outside world. To this end, South Africa has historically been the
"provider" of such links for Botswana and to some extent for the entire region.
This phenomenon in my view, is unlikely to drastically change, although other vital
links that were not in existence will now be explored or those that were deliberately crippled
by Pretoria will now be fully utilized; for example, the "Trans-Kalahari" highway that cuts
across the expanse of the desert in the west is provided for in the 7th NDP. This road will
31 Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen (ed. EM. Maphanyane): Southern Africa. In Search of a Common
Future. From the Conference to a Community . SADC, 1994, p. 41.
32UNITA was a guerrilla movement opposing government in Angola and heavily reliant on South African
assistance.
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link Botswana directly with Namibia and the ports therein particularly, Walvis Bay. (NDP 7,
1991-97, p. 7) Refer to the map of Botswana at Figure 3 below.
Although it is still arguable that South Africa's communication networks will continue
to be dominant in the region, at least cooperation and alternative routes will be made available
for Botswana. There is no question that the country will continue to be dependent on her
neighbors for external links, and it is for this and other equally important reasons that compel
the country to support regional integration.
2. The End of the Cold War and the Democratization of South Africa
The collapse of the Soviet Union and with it, the cold war that ensued between the
East and the West leading to political, ideological and other forms of antagonisms across the
globe, heralds an opportunity for integration not only in Southern Africa but in the entire
world as well.
Central to this argument at least in the Southern African context, is the fact that South
Africa was supported and sustained by the West in their quest to destroy communism, that
rationale has since ceased to exist when communism fell, and this has led to democracy in
South Africa in effect, creating a very conducive environment for democratic integration in
the region.
The use of the term democracy in this context implies the actual use of such a
phenomenon in regional fora by democratic states, as opposed to the employment of elements
of national power in pursuit of selfish national interests. Chapter I of this research addresses










Figure 3. Map of Botswana.
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To this end, South Africa's liberation movements had expressed their willingness to
work together with the rest of the region to create a new pattern of regional relations along
those lines. In a statement made on behalf of South African Liberation movements to the
1991 SADCC Annual Consultative Conference, ANC President, Nelson Mandela had said,
"[A] liberated South Africa will come into SADCC on the basis of an agreed regional plan
that would ensure balanced regional development and mutually beneficial cooperation among
various countries." 33
True to this commitment, after the historic shift toward democratic independence,
South Africa was indeed welcomed into the organization as the eleventh member in August
of 1994. The organization had since shifted from its original premise of isolationism in
relation to South Africa to one of accommodation. The Declaration Treaty and Protocol that
gave birth to a new SADC was signed in August of 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia by member
states. South Africa ratified the instrument of accession to the same Treaty and Protocol on
the 29th of August 1994; in effect echoing the very statement once made by President
Mandela regarding equitable distribution of resources in the region.
Chapter 7, Article 21 (1) particularly provides for this mutual benefit of member
countries: "Member states shall cooperate in all areas necessary to foster regional
development and integration on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit." 34
33 SADC: Regional Relations and Cooperation Post Apartheid. Botswana Cooperative Union Printers,
Gaborone, 1993, p. 2.
34 SADC: Declaration Treaty and Protocol of Southern African Development Community : Gaborone
Printing Works, Gaborone, 1995, p. 18.
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3. Botswana's Inability to Unilaterally Achieve Her National Interests
If history is anything to go by, it is quite manifest that Botswana is in no position to
unilaterally and successfully achieve her national interests without external input. Firstly, the
geographical misfortune of the country dictates that it should out of necessity, collude with
its neighbors.
Secondly, Botswana is still a developing country in economic terms as seen already
in Chapter I of this research. Historically, Botswana has had to rely heavily on external
support for her economic survival; this argument is still pertinent today.
Subsequently, it is in fact in Botswana's interest to help foster regional integration in
Southern Africa which is clarified further on reviewing the following aspects:
a. Mining and Agriculture
Botswana's economy derives its strength from a number of inputs among
which diamonds are in the fore front. The prospecting, investment capital to include roads,
mining itself and the sale of these precious germs, was done and still is done with the help of
the South African De Beers Mining Company in partnership with the government of
Botswana. It is doubtful whether there will be any changes in the status quo, so that the
current partnership will continue to obtain.
Other mining projects including prospecting will also continue with the aid of
external private companies especially from South Africa. The current Soda Ash mining
project at Sua Pan, about 400 kilo meters west of Francistown is one more example that is
done with the help of private South African investors.
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Although its importance has somewhat diminished, agriculture remains one
of the important industries in Botswana, accounting for about 4 percent of the total GDP.
To this end, its importance cannot be under estimated. Thus, "the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) countries signed the
Lome Convention Agreements in 1975. These agreements removed the EEC ban on beef
imports from ACP countries, but subjected them to the EEC's prohibitive variable import
levy" (Thundberg, 1978, p. 45)
As a ramification, Botswana and other ACP beef exporters obtained a 90 per
cent reduction on the levy for six months by mid 1975. After much protesting by late 1976,
the quota was increased to 1 2 months. In the interim, Botswana strived very hard to diversify
its markets within the Southern African region as well as the rest of the world. It is likely that
this trend will continue, and closer to home, this may be greatly facilitated even more through
a regional effort for sales within and without the region.
b. Communications
Since independence, Botswana has been striving hard to create a
communication infrastructure that would not only link the country with others in the region,
but also with the rest of the world. Historically, the single rail road system running mostly
on the eastern side of the country, originally built by the British to join the British Cape
colony with Rhodesia, has been most instrumental in generating and sustaining Botswana's
economy
To this end, the development of industry along its length was encouraged and
it stimulated the marketing of products of traditional industry at home and abroad Today,
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this rail track has branches at Senile linked to the copper mine in Selebe Phikwe, Palapye,
adjoining the Morupule coal mine and at Francistown, joining the new soda ash mining
project at Sua Pan.
These three branches principally cater for mining products while the main
route caters for both the movement ofgoods and services and people. Although other modes
of transportation have come into the picture, "the rail road still accounts for about three
quarters ofthe tonnage of freight originating or terminating in Botswana" (Thundberg, 1978,
p. 29). Also, "rail traffic fell over the period of 1986/87 to 1989/90. Reasons for the decline
in freight traffic include the desire of SADCC member states to reduce dependence on South
African ports, lower growth rates elsewhere in the region of competition from the Beit Bridge
rail route." (NDP 7, 1991 - 1997, p. 198) Hence, with South Africa as a player in the region,
it is arguable that the rail road will become one of the largest transport modes in Botswana
Hence, "this single track system although small, carries a major share of the
total traffic within the country, servicing both the internal transport needs and the
export/import trade. Virtually all vital commodities, including coal, petroleum products,
copper nickel matte, cattle and meat are transported on the railway." (NDP 5, 1979-85, p.
238) Refer to Figure 4 below depicting the Southern African railway system.
Subsequently, Botswana has access by rail to ports in Mozambique, Tanzania
as well as South Africa. The construction and maintenance of houses, roads, industry among
other endeavors, has taken off mostly although not wholly due to South African private











Figure 4. The Southern African Rail Network System.
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instrumental in the construction of the "BOTZAM" road; the road linking Nata/Kazungulaand
Zambia and thus providing another alternative rote for Botswana.
NDP 7 has also provided for a major road linking Botswana to Namibia across
the Kalahari desert on the west , and thus opening up another alternative route to Namibian
ports and markets that have not been exploited before. (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 7) It is arguable
therefore that external input to the construction of such a road will be crucial both in terms
of investment capital and qualified manpower for the project See Figure 5 which depicts
Botswana's national road network below.
c. Tourism
Among Botswana's other important sources ofrevenue is tourism; "it has been
estimated that tourism may have accounted for as much as 2.5 per cent of gross domestic
product (GDP), in 1988/89, equivalent to about PI 25 million. This compares favorably with
the shares ofGDP attributed to agriculture and manufacturing, which amounted to about 3.0
per cent and 4.2 percent respectively, in 1988/89." (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 295)
Clearly, tourism is an important aspect of Botswana's economy However,
adverse political activities in neighboring countries had discouraged and even threatened the
tourist industry. In particular, the proximity of Botswana's most developed national parks to
the then volatile theaters ofwar in Zimbabwe and Namibia had severe adverse impact on the
prospects for tourism.
However, problems in this areas did not disappear with political stability in












Figure 5. Botswana's National Roads Network.
illegal and even more problematic phenomenon to deal with - poaching of Botswana's wild
life believed to be perpetuated by citizens of neighboring countries.
To this end, the Department of Wild life and National Parks has been assisted by the
BDF in their anti-poaching campaigns. "The BDF also assisted the Department of Wild life
and National Parks with anti-poaching activities." (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 438) Nevertheless,
however vigilant these BDF/Wild life Department anti-poaching campaigns are, as long as
poachers are of external origin, countries of their origin need to be part and parcel of these
campaigns in order to successfully stem out the problem.
Failure to ensure this may lead to the problem becoming a monotonous and cyclical
problem which might become a bottomless pit into which resources will continuously be lost.
The other negative spin off of this issue could be the fueling of inter-country hostilities; for
example, in the process of performing their duties, responsible units may end up killing
poachers (who are said to operate with automatic weapons and have been known to engage
such units), and such fatal confrontations may lead to vehement protests from neighboring
countries in defense of their "citizens."
This state of affairs would not auger well for any regional cooperation efforts. Thus,
it becomes pertinent for Botswana and her neighbors to jointly review and resolve the
problem.
d. Security
Another aspect that dictates external input is that of Botswana's internal
security. During the height of the cold war, the most notable threat was profoundly external
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in nature. With the advent ofindependence notably in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia,
such independence did not obliterate these threats.
Botswana like all sovereign polities is constantly under an external threat of
some form or another albeit this threat has hitherto been minimized. However, disputes that
cannot be amicably resolved may lead to inter-state confrontations. It is on this note that
Botswana and her regional partners need to exercise restraint and refer all thorny matters to
the negotiating table if confrontation is to be avoided As a result, regional integration
becomes a very important vehicle in this regard.
On the other side of the same coin, assuming that governments in the region
dance to the same tune, the security threat on all the countries has evolved into an "intra-
country" affair; armed robberies and violence inter alia have spared no member country within
the region. Therefore be it AK 47 wielding poachers, bank robbers, car thieves and
racketeers, the crux ofthe matter is that some regional concerted efforts are necessary to deal
with the problems. These individuals perform their acts of aggression in one country and then
flee into another to seek refuge from the law.
According to Ohlson and Stedman, "during the cease fire in Angola in 1992,
weapons experts noted that the Angolan weapons were being sold in South Africa. A sizeable
cross boarder trade in AK 47's has developed from Mozambique back to South Africa, fueling
violence in Natal and the Vaal Triangle. Such developments show that conflict resolution
cannot be based solely within nations, but must take into account the larger region as a
whole." (Ohlson and Stedman, in South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex
of Violence, 1993, p 420) Currently Botswana has extradition treaties with South Africa
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among others in the region, and this goes a long way in assisting in the curbing of violence
in the country. It is also a member of some form of a "regional Interpol" where information
on crime, criminals and such syndicates can be obtained when needed.
e. Social Considerations
On the social plane, people in Southern Africa belong to a large African family
historians have referred to as the Bantu speaking people. 35 In this way, cooperation could be
fostered on an understanding of similar origin. However, economic inequalities in the region
could very well pose a serious threat to Botswana among others in the sub continent
South Africa's economic hegemony continues to act as a beacon to various
nationalities within the region. It is therefore arguable that the majority of the people in the
region would like to migrate to South Africa where better socio-economic opportunities are
available. It is also in the process ofgoing to South Africa that some will inevitably find their
way into Botswana should they fail to land in "paradise" they will be pursuing. Please refer
to Figure 6 below, portraying recent migrations in Southern Africa.
The implications of these mass movements should not be under-emphasized,
for one thing they may spark off hostilities in South Africa and else where toward
employment seeking "foreigners" as a result of intensified competition for scarce
opportunities. On the other equally important side of the same coin, they may result in
serious "brain drain" from originating countries. SADC has already expressed fears in this
regard and therefore, concerted regional efforts are imperative.













Figure 6. Southern Africa Recent Migrations. (Source. South Africa and its neighbors.
Rotberg, et. al).
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4. Existing Structural Foundations for Integration
There have been and still are historical platforms upon which integration can be
facilitated in Southern Africa, albeit these fora have depicted a strong tilt toward economics
in the region as opposed to other equally crucial aspects like security. These economic
groupings are listed in the order of their establishment as follows; the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU), the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the Southern African
Development Conference (SADC) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern
African States (PTA).
a. SACU
SACU was "the first customs union in Southern Africa between the Cape of
Good Hope and the Orange Free State - was established in 1889, and by the mid 1890's all
the countries of the present SACU except Namibia were in a customs union together." 36
Namibia's membership in SACU was formalized in 1 990 when it attained its independence,
although it was treated as part of the arrangement even when it was still administered by
South Africa as South West Africa.
According to Maasdorp, SACU is the only economic integration arrangement
in the sub continent. It provides for the duty free movement of goods and services among
member countries and for a common external tariff against the rest of the world. It is
therefore a customs and excise union since all custom duties and excise taxes are part of the
common revenue pool administered by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB).
36Gavin Maasdorp. Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa; Prospects for Regional Integration.
Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992, p. 5.
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Revenue is shared among member countries according to a formula which
includes a raising factor of 42 percent to compensate Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and
Namibia commonly referred to as the BLSN countries. This measure is some form of
compensation for the BLSN countries for being in partnership with a more economically
developed and industrialized partner - South Africa.
The amounts thus calculated are then adjusted by a stabilization factor so as
to ensure a reasonably consistent rate of revenue for BLSN. Thus, "in terms of the
Agreement, any BLSN country may protect new industries by levying additional duties on
imports for a maximum of eight years; specify industries which are likely to be of importance
to its economy as well as the period over which these industries should receive tariff
assistance and relief; and prohibit the importation ofgoods for "economic, social, cultural and
other reasons." (Maasdorp, 1992, p. 5)
It is manifest then that Botswana and other countries in the region could utilize
this forum to facilitate integration in the region.
b. CMA
The BLS countries have utilized the South African currency from the
beginning of the monetization of their economies in the second half of the 19th century, and
Namibia did so after its occupation in the first world war. According to Maasdorp however,
the first formal monetary agreement was signed in 1974 between South Africa, Lesotho and
Swaziland, the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) while Botswana elected not to join
To this end, the BLS countries could use their own currencies for internal use
and the South African Rand was to be used for foreign exchange transactions and was to be
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legal tender throughout the entire area. The RMA provided for uninhibited inter country
fiscal movements to include; compensation for loss of interest these members would have
earned on external reserves, access to South African money and capital markets etc.
Hence, each country was responsible for its own internal fiscal controls while
South Africa was solely responsible for the management of the rand currency and gold and
foreign exchange reserves ofthe RMA. By 1986, Swaziland among others in the region had
successfully lobbied for a change in the set up which gave birth to Tri-lateral Monetary
Agreement (TMA) leading to the CMA.
The CMA provided for the following; Swaziland and Lesotho could issue their
own currencies but the rand could no longer be legal tender in Swaziland (although in
practice, it is quite widely used). In Lesotho, the rand and Maloti (Lesotho's currency) would
both be legal tender there. Although both countries are free to authorize foreign exchange
payments in their countries and have agreed to apply similar controls to those of the SARB,
they have not exercised this right due to the practical advantages of having parity with the
rand.
On the other hand, Botswana introduced her own currency - the Pula in 1975
and thus practically withdrawing from the RMA to enable her to pursue independent
exchange rates and monetary policies. This was a result of the fact that, South Africa as a
dominant partner in the RMA influenced the policies of the entire region by its own internal
economic actions. Namibia introduced her own new currency in July of 1993, it is also
arguable however, that the rand may continue to be widely used therein.
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The CMA with its current three members, LSN, the past association with it
by Botswana, together with the membership of South Africa in SADC, and "the evident need
for some harmonization of monetary and exchange rate policy as a key pillar of an integration
program has led to suggestions that the CMA should be enlarged and the rand become a
regional currency. The CMA could serve as a nucleus of regional monetary and financial
integration upon which to build the whole community's monetary and financial arrangements."
(SADC, 1993, p. 80)
However, democratic inter country fiscal dealings leading to mutually equitable
benefits could be the only paramount reason behind the acceptance of this thinking.
c. SADC
"The first SADC meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1979, aimed
at harmonizing development plans and reducing the regions economic dependence on South
Africa, resulting in nine (9) member countries from Southern Africa signing a treaty."
(SADC: Theme Document, 1992)
Clearly, the rationale for SADC was to lessen the other regional members'
dependence on South Africa, and possibly as a measure to politically ostracize the republic.
With a democratic South Africa and a member of the same organization, SADC's original
motive has ceased to exist. Consequently, the organization has had to make a revised outlook
especially in relation to South Africa.
Thus, the latter was heartily accepted into the "new" organization after she
signed the instrument of accession on the 29th of August in 1994. In effect, ratifying the new
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SADC Treaty and Protocol which resulted from the Windhoek summit of August 1992, that
gave SADC its new accommodative in the stead of its original isolationist complexion.
SADC operates on the basis of the following institutions established by
Chapter 5, Articles 9 through 16 of its Treaty and Protocol:
(1) The Summit. The Summit consists of heads of State or
governments of member countries and are the supreme policy making, directing and
controlling organ of SADC. Their decision is reached by consensus and is legally binding on
members. Thus, the Summit meets annually and is the supreme political organ behind the
existence and sustenance of SADC.
However, these political representatives are elected by their own
citizens in their own countries and it is arguable therefore that their political allegiance first
and foremost rests with their respective countries as opposed to SADC.
(2) The Council. The Council consists of ministers from member
countries preferably those responsible for economic planning or finance. They meet annually
and basically oversee execution of policies and objectives set down by the Summit. They are
also capable of generating policies themselves in line with the provisions of the Treaty and act
as advisors to the Summit. Decisions of the Council are also reached by consensus. Council
members are also politicians in their own right in their respective countries.
(3) The Commissions. These are permanent and or ad hoc bodies
created for specific projects and have to be approved by the Summit through an appropriate
protocol. They are responsible to and report to the Council.
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(4) The Standing Committee of Officials This is a technical advisory
committee for the Council and reports to it. It also meets annually and its decisions are also
reached by a consensus. Its membership consists of permanent secretaries or government
officials of equivalent rank from member states, preferably one from the ministry responsible
for economic planning or finance.
(5) The Secretariat. This is the principal executive institution of
SADC and is headed by an Executive Secretary who is responsible for:
1
.
Strategic planning and management of the programs of SADC.
2 Implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council
3
.
Organization and management of SADC meetings.
4 Financial and general administration.
5 Representation and promotion of SADC.
6. Coordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies of member states.
(6) The Executive Secretary. This is the main institution within SADC
that is responsible for the daily successful operations of the organization, and is appointed for
a four year term renewable for another period not exceeding four years.
(7) The Tribunal. The tribunal is an ad hoc body incepted when there
is a need for adjudication on dispute arising out of misinterpretation of the provisions of the
Treaty, or need for advisory legal opinions by the Summit and the council. Its decisions are
final and binding Consequently, the Tribunal is to SADC what the International Court of
Justice is to the United Nations.
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However, interpretation of the law is a very fluid undertaking such
that, no two bodies can interpret the same thing in precisely the same way Consequently, it
has been argued that even though decisions of such bodies are binding, there could still be
room for further varying interpretation.
So far, it has been manifest that SADC is a body that fosters
cooperation from an economical premise. In my considered opinion, SADC has thus far
continued to maintain its original outlook except that it has also welcomed South Africa to
its ranks. To this end, other equally important aspect like security are not addressed by the
organization.
As a ramification, the 1995 SADC Consultative Conference held in
Lilongwe, Malawi, "welcomed the creation of the new sector on Politics, Democracy, Peace
and Security. SADC's international partners do support and welcome such a move, and they
subsequently urged SADC to work out the modalities, structures and mandates for the
sector." (SADC: Resources, Institutions and capacity for Integration, 1995, p. 178)
d ThePTA
The PTA by nature is in conflict with SADC; the latter permits counter trade,
protectionism etc., while the former aims to increase trade in a larger region than SADC by
decreasing tariffs and other trade barriers. See Figure 7 below for the PTA membership as
at 1984. Consequently, both organizations can be harmonized to pursue objectives that




Figure 7. The PTA membership.
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5. Free Market Economic Globalism
The end of the cold war has led to a possibility of the internationalization of
democracy and with it a free economic market system. In this way, Kenichi Ohmae argues
that consumerism will be a crucial factor in the world stage especially as depicted in the
United States of America.
Thus, "large numbers of people from more points on the globe than ever before have
aggressively come forward to participate in history They have left behind centuries, even
millennia, of obscurity in forest and desert and rural isolation to request from the world
community - and from the global economy that links it together - a decent life for themselves
and a better life for their children. A generation ago, even a decade ago, most of them were
as voiceless and invisible as they always have been. This is true no longer: they have entered
history with a vengeance, and they have demands - economic demands - to make." (Ohmae,
1995, p. 1)
As a ramification, these concerted demands on governments within given political
boundaries, will be too overbearing that the need for economics to transcend political
boundaries if those demands are not met (which they won't) is inevitable. To this end,
especially today in the latter part of the 20th century, economics has especially demonstrated
to know no geographical boundaries as a result of what Ohmae refers to as the four I's.
These are: investment, industry, information and technology and individual consumers. To
this end, regional integration especially manifested through SADC becomes the vehicle
through which these factors can be achieved.
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B. INVESTMENT
Without a doubt, investment is and has always been driven by profit which is in turn
tied to the availability of a market within any given area or region. If there are high
possibilities for a profitable venture anywhere around the globe, investment (international),
follows and Ohmae argues that it is for the most part "private." Thus, government
participation and the subsequent controls associated with it are reduced if not done away
with. Hence, "money will go where good opportunities are." (Ohmae, 1995, p. 3)
C. INDUSTRY
Industry is similar to investment in its global outlook. As corporations move across
the globe looking for greener pastures, they bring with them working capital. From the latter,
technological and managerial know-how is transferred to the host country It is not so
because the host state has struck certain economic deals with the investors but rather because,
in order to survive in this economically competitive world stage, it becomes imperative that
they do so or ignore to do so at their own peril.
As a result, these "economic migrations" are shaped and governed not by reasons of
state but by the desire and the need to serve attractive markets wherever they exist.
Consequently, "the western firms now moving, say, into parts of China and India are there
because that is where their future lies, not because the host government has suddenly dangled
a carrot in front of their nose." (Ohmae, 1995, p 3)
D. INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY AND INDIVIDUAL CONSUMERS
Information and technology has also driven individual consumerism on a global scale.
With better access to information about lifestyles around the globe, consumers have been
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placed in a position where they make their own choices; they want the best and the cheapest
products regardless of their origin, and according to Ohmae, they have shown their
willingness to vote these preferences with their pocket books.
Consequently, "global brands ofblue jeans, colas and stylish athletic shoes are as much
on the mind ofthe taxi driver in Shanghai as they are in the kitchen or the closet of the school
teacher in Stockholm or Sao Paulo" (Ohmae, 1995, p. 29). Thus, as the quality, range and
availability of information improves, so does the awareness of people regarding their needs
and economic choices irrespective of their geographical location.
Having said that then, it becomes manifest that regional integration becomes the only
viable means to prevent the region from being completely swallowed up by international




Given the past hardships that Botswana found herself in as a result of all the historical
factors discussed in Chapter I, it seems arguable that the country will pursue more or less the
same approach in pursuit of its national interests.
However, because of changes in the world political climate, especially in the context
of the Southern African region, integration seems to be the most potent of all avenues A




There is a natural tendency toward regionalism based on the homogeneity of
interests, traditions, and values within small groups of neighboring states
2. Political, economic, and social integration is more easily attained among a lessor
number of states within a limited geographical area than on a global basis.
3
.
Regional economic cooperation provides more efficient economic units than the
smaller states, and these larger units can compete successfully in the world
markets.
4. Local threats to the peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by the
governments ofthat area than disinterested states at greater distances (Bennett,
1995, pp. 230-231)
These regional organizations have been categorized into groups depending on the
nature or scope of their functions, or memberships, or the eventual degree of integration
sought. According to Bennett, these groups are; multi-purpose, alliance, functional or U.N.
regional organizations. (Bennett, 1995, p. 236)
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For purposes of this research, focus will be on the first three categories. Thus, "the
multi-purpose organizations are those whose broad aims and activities reach across the lines
that divide political and military matters from those generally classified as economic and
social. Alliance-type organizations are those whose military and political orientation is
intended to provide security against external actors. Functional organizations are those that
promote economic, social, or political collaboration, with little or no regard to security
factors." (Bennett, 1995, p. 236)
From the above definitions, it is clear that all the regional endeavors thus far attempted
in the region, generally tend to fall under functionalism. To this end, SADC itself has
expressed this outlook with a view perhaps to evolving into a multi-purpose organization; the
1 995 SADC Consultative Conference held in Lilongwe, Malawi expressed a need for a new
sector within SADC for politics, democracy, peace and security In this way then, SADC may
well become a "supra- national body" within the region. The "classic" example of the
European Union comes to mind.
It is instructive to note however that, although arguments for regional integration are
very convincing, integrating countries often run into or generate a quagmire of problems for
the organization which threatens its very existence; "the emergence of a host of new
independent states, seeking separate identities, jealous of their sovereign prerogatives, and
determined to seek the promotion of their national interests, not through an onslaught on the
state system but within its framework." (Bennett, 1995, p. 263)
Thus, even the classic European Union has not escaped this political pit fall, so that
the question that still remains is whether the organization is indeed supra-national or simply,
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a collaboration of sovereign states Different European scholars have come up with varying
labels to try and provide an answer to this haunting question. Jacques Delors - the french
diplomat, has advocated subsidiarity as the answer, Margaret Thatcher on the other hand, has
vehemently argued that a collaboration of sovereign European states is the way to go as
opposed to ceding all political power to a regional organization. Consequently, emphasizing
on national sovereignty.
These arguments in my mind fall on a spectrum; with emphasis on sovereign states on
one end and supra-nationalism on the other end, which to me is no different from federalism
as we know it, (if individual sovereign states were to completely cede their sovereignty to a
representative supra-national body). In this way, it can then be argued that in fact, political
members of such a body will have to be responsible and answerable to such a body and not
their respective places of origin. Consequently, they might also have to be elected at that
level so that their allegiance would be unshakable.
This is a crucial and problematic issue for many organizations which will continue to
be the bone of contention among integrating states. Perhaps historically speaking, all states
both young and old, are not yet ready for such regional endeavors and therefore, they should
pursue a functional approach even in multi-purpose organizations.
The other problem is that of selfishness on the part of powerful countries. For
example, "the OAS, as a multi-purpose organization, has also been perverted, through military
and political intervention, into an instrument of the United States foreign policy within the
hemisphere. It has provided a cloak of legitimacy for unilateral United States action"
(Bennett, 1995, p. 263)
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The remedy to this problem in my view is the adherence to principle of democracy as
espoused in Chapter I of this research. In this way, it is hoped that with South Africa's full
cooperation, a strong regional organization may be made. Thus far, South Africa has been
agreeable in this regard. It is therefore manifest that, the Southern African countries must
tow the line toward regionalism for them to be competitive on the world stage, and also
satisfy their citizens demands at home, or neglect this aspect at their own peril.
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